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ABSTRACT: The scope of this study is analyzing the institution of jud-
ges ad hoc, since its origin on the Permanente Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) until its treatment on the most important present inter-
national permanent courts: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (ICHR) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), among others. Furthermore, this work brings 
up considerations about the necessity and importance of judges ad 
hoc on the contemporary international legal system, and their rela-
tion with essential topics such as legitimacy, nationality, the States´ 
consent and the principle of the juge naturel. Moreover, the present 
paper aims to clarify that justifications presented to include this old 
rule on the current legal system are not valid on a globalized multi-
lateral society, being absolutely essential abolishing the figure of the 
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judges ad hoc and to innovate the international order, adequating it 
to the dramatic changes occurred on the last 50 years, and inserting 
it on a post-habermasian paradigm.
KEY WORDS: judges ad hoc – international courts – consultive com-
petences – legal judge
RESUMEN: El objetivo de este estudio es el análisis de la institución de 
los jueces ad hoc, desde sus orígenes en la Corte Permanente de Justicia 
Internacional hasta su tratamiento en los más importantes tribunales inter-
nacionales permanentes de la contemporaneidad: la Corte Internacional 
de Justicia, el Tribunal Internacional para el Derecho del Mar, la Corte 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Corte Europea de Derechos 
Humanos, entre otros. Por otro lado, este trabajo nos lleva a considera-
ciones sobre la necesidad e importancia de los jueces ad hoc en el actual 
ordenamiento jurídico internacional, y su relación con temas esenciales 
como la legitimidad, la nacionalidad, el consentimiento y el principio 
del juez natural. Más, el presente trabajo tiene por objeto aclarar que las 
justificaciones presentadas para incluir esta regla anacrónica en el sistema 
legal actual no son válidas en una sociedad multilateral y globalizada. Así, 
es imprescindible la abolición de la figura de los jueces ad hoc, de modo 
a adecuar el orden internacional a los dramáticos cambios ocurridos en 
los últimos 50 años, insertándole en un paradigma post-habermasiano.
PALABRAS CLAVE: jueces ad hoc – tribunales internacionales – compe-
tencia consultiva – juez natural 
OVERVIEW
In the last few years it is undeniable that the increment on the globali-
zation process, for better or not, brought significant epistemic changes1 and 
challenges2, particularly on fields related to International Law. In this current 
“multilateralized” world, the internationalization of many subjects - which were 
before exclusive competences of internal law - and the relativization of the 
concept of sovereignty3 were still not able to bring up a general international 
jurisdiction4, but, in spite of that, the contemporary society is marked by the 
1 soros (2002).
2 stiglitZ (2003).
3 seidl-hohenveldern (1992). 
4 MérignhaC (1905) p. 78.
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strengthening of an international order, with a relevant increase in the number 
of international institutions, many of them with jurisdictional scope. 
Therefore, this present international jurisdictional panorama –characterized 
by the emergence of new subjects and a brand new structure on international 
relationships– deserves an appropriate reflection, capable to overcome an 
archaic conception of International Law based on the concept of absolute 
sovereignty, incompatible with the principles of interdependence, harmonic 
mutual growth, sustainable development and cooperation.5
If the judges´ role on international courts is not anymore being merely 
bouches de la loi –in accordance to the classic Montesquieu´s lesson–, in a 
world where there is an increasing active posture from the magistracy on the 
construction of an International Law with a real effet utile, on a dworkinian 
attitude6, all questions related to who our judges are and what do we wish on 
that subject assume greater relevance.
Following this premise, the scope of this paper is presenting the institu-
tion of judges ad hoc on the main international Tribunals, and analyzing their 
compatibility with the most recent developments on International Law.7
On the first part of this study, it will be constructed an objective analysis 
of the theme of judges ad hoc. This work begins with a historical background, 
looking for the roots of the institution of judges ad hoc on the PCIJ Statute, and 
its influence on the main contemporary international permanent Courts, such 
as the ICJ, the ITLOS, the ICHR and the IEHR, besides of an analysis en passant 
about the main rules concerning the nationality of the adjudicators in other 
decisory organs, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Panel’s structure 
on the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Criminal Court and 
also on arbitration rules, such as the ones stated by the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC), the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID).
Moreover, it will be laid out a presentation of some important issues 
concerning to the present treatment of this matter, as the role of judges ad hoc 
in consultive proceedings (Namibia case), their nomination as a faculty of the 
parties (Aegean Sea case) and the main rights and duties of those members, 
5 delos (1950) p. 305. 
6 MurPhy and PritChett (1961) p. 107, Cordero (1987) p. 255.
7 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p. 180. 
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analyzing particular aspects like the requirements for their nomination, their 
remuneration, their immunities and privileges, the oath and the incompatibi-
lities of that function.
On its second part, this paper will introduce considerations about the 
importance and necessity of the constitution of judges ad hoc on a pragmatist 
paradigm, through a criterious analysis of the main arguments pro and against 
such institution. The research will raise the idea that many aspects used to justify 
the intervention of judges ad hoc on international permanent tribunals do not 
resist to a deeper investigation, when considered as parts of a post-habermasian 
paradigm with inspiration on the transmodernity proposed by Dussel.
Furthermore, it will be offered some considerations about the role of 
judges ad hoc and its relations with the principle of the juge naturel, as well 
as a discussion concerning some difficulties on this subject, such as the case 
of the evolution of the conception of nationality.
In sum, this study has the scope to bring up a complete panorama of the 
judges ad hoc’s performance on the main international permanent courts, 
their purposes, and their role on the persecution of a brand new concept of 
International Law on a contemporary globalized and transnational society.
I. JUDGES AD HOC ON THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL PERMANENT 
COURTS
1. The origin of the modern concept of judges ad hoc – the PCIJ
In order to precisely understand the importance of this subject, it is ne-
cessary going back in time to find the roots of the institution of judges ad hoc, 
which are stated on the PCIJ Statute, in the beginning of the 20th century.
It was perfectly understandable that, on a post-World War I scenario, when 
international society was occupied trying to solve the States´ internal problems 
and looking for a way to guarantee the peace and to take up again economic 
development –which had achieved its efflorescence on the Belle Époque– States 
kept reticent to accept a new international legal system which obliged them 
to abdicate from its own sovereignties in favor of a unique international order.
So, it is clear, when analyzing the structuration of the PCIJ Statute, on the 
early 20´s, the concern of making the dream of an efficient international system 
and the challenge to keep intact the sovereign power of each State agrees. As 
a result of that thought, the plan elaborated by Lord Root and Lord Phillimore 
for the PCIJ Statute tried to add in a same legal order this ambivalent posture 
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which was prevalent in those times. The PCIJ Statute was so, an attempt to make 
feasible on the international praxis the intervention of a Court with universal 
scope.
An example of that concern in maintaining the identities of the States on 
this new legal panorama is the rule of the article 31 of the PCIJ Statute8, which 
creates the basis of the institution of judges ad hoc on international permanent 
Courts. As a result of intense debates9, the inclusion of that article is the root of 
this work, since it is based on that clause that, later, the ICJ and several other 
contemporary international jurisdictional organs –such as the ITLOS, the ICHR 
and the ECHR– incorporated similar rules in their own statutes. 
Accordingly to the logic that prevailed on the PCIJ´s norms, the equality 
between the parties should be expressed not only on the application of material 
norms, but also on the proceeding rules.10
So, in cases when one State which was party on an international contro-
versy had already an own national between the judges and the other party had 
not, it was configured a huge disproportion among the litigants, which would 
be inconceivable for the whole system. 
8 PCIJ, Statute, article 31: “Judges of the nationality of each of the contesting parties shall 
retain their right to sit in the case before the Court. If the Court includes upon the Bench 
a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, the other party may choose a person to sit 
as judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have 
been nominated as candidates as provided in articles 4 and 5. If the Court includes upon 
the Bench no judge of the nationality of the contesting parties, each of these parties may 
proceed to select a judge as provided in the preceding paragraph. / The present provision 
shall apply to the case of articles 26, 27 and 29. In such cases, the President shall request 
one or, if necessary, two of the members of the Court forming the Chamber to give place 
to the members of the Court of the nationality of the parties concerned, and, failing such 
or if they are unable to be present, to the judges specially appointed by the parties. Should 
there be several parties in the same interest, they shall, for the purpose of the preceding 
provisions, be reckoned as one party only. Any doubt upon this point is settled by the 
decision of the Court ./ Judges selected as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this 
article shall fulfill the conditions required by articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20 and 24 of 
this Statute. They shall take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their 
colleagues”.
9 league oF nations / advisory CoMMittee oF Jurists (1920), sChWeBel (1999) p. 320.
10 sCoBBie (2005) p. 428. 
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There was a proposal, when jurists were discussing the elaboration of 
the Statute, to avoid this disparity simply preventing the nationals of judging 
in cases related to their countries of origin, declaring their incompetence on 
those specific demands. However, the great powers did not agree with the fact 
of having to give up from their nationals as judges precisely when their own 
interests were being discussed.11 
After that negative, it was necessary taking another way to guarantee the 
equality between the litigants. The solution found to preserve the stability and 
fairness was not excluding a magistrate, but adding another one, nominated 
by the party which had no nationals between the judges.12 
Furthermore, once the Tribunal accepted the institution of judges ad hoc, 
that same understanding had to be extended also to situations when no party 
had a national among the titular bench of judges.
It comes up, on this way, the figure of the judge ad hoc, appointed by one 
party to serve as judge on a specific litis, possessing, however, the same rights 
and obligations imposed to the other members of the Tribunal.
Besides guaranteeing the isonomy, other reasons were pointed to justify 
the insertion of this article on the PCIJ Statute, exempli gratia, the strengthening 
on the Tribunal’s legitimacy, the possibility for the parties to explain their points 
of view before a national which is able to have a better understanding of their 
internal circumstances, their specificities, their language and their internal law, 
besides stimulating the States´ participation on the agenda of those relevant 
international fori.
In brief, the justification for the insertion of this rule on the PCIJ Statute, 
given by Lord Phillimore is that “it would be necessary to make it possible for 
parties to be represented on the Court by a member of their nationality; or that 
at any rate it would be necessary to prevent one party being represented if the 
other party were not. There were several ways of obtaining this end; the judge 
of the nationality of one party might be excluded, or a judge of the nationality 
of the other might be added, but, in his opinion, it would be preferable to give 
a national representative for both parties, not only to protect their interests, 
but to enable the Court to understand certain questions which require highly 
11 JiMeneZ De AréChaga (1980) p. 180.
12 Ibídem.
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specialized knowledge and relate to the differences between the various legal 
systems”.13 
2. The contemporary courts
A) the iNterNAtioNAl court of justice 
Later, after the World War II, when there was the foundation of the United 
Nations14 and, subsequently, the creation of the ICJ15, the historical moment 
was very similar to the one happened when the PCIJ´s Statute was elaborated. 
In those times, there was also a great lack of confidence on the real effet utile 
of international organizations, because of the concrete inefficaciousness of 
organizations such as the League of the Nations16 and the PCIJ on avoiding 
international conflicts. 
Thus, the foundation of the United Nations did not try to establish a real 
supranational order, but it was a clear attempt to create a forum where all the 
States would be able to express their points of view and, through multilateral 
efforts, to keep peace, order and justice.17 The UN was not elaborated to act as 
a vertical power over the States18, but as a possibility of a multilateral institution 
guaranteeing the material isonomy between different countries, independently 
of their wealth, size or location. 
By this notion, it is perfectly understandable why the ICJ preserved the 
referred clause of the article 31 of the PCIJ´s Statute on its own rules.19 And it 
was exactly on the ambit of the ICJ that the main discussions specifically about 
that norm were brought up, as what happened at the Aegean Sea case (Turkey 
vs. Greece) and at the Namibia case (Namibia vs. South Africa). There is also, 
on the ICJ, a vast jurisprudence which counts with the relevant and decisive 
participation of judges ad hoc, as will be exposed later on this study.
13 league oF Nations / advisory CoMMittee oF Jurists (1920) p. 528.
14 steiner in AMBos and Choukr (2000) p. 293.
15 ghevontian (1992) p. 136. 
16 alBreCht-Carrié (1958) p.604. 
17 Mello (1995) p. 159. 
18 hegel (1997) p. 303.
19 guillauMe (1992) p. 10.
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The rules of the PCIJ´s Statute on this topic were practically copied ipsis 
literis on the ICJ Statute, elaborated in 1945.20
Nonetheless, the inclusion of that rule which allows the nomination of 
judges ad hoc seems to be no more adequate on the globalized world confi-
gured in the beginning of a new millennium. As discussed before, this rule has 
roots on the classic constitutionalism of the 19th century21, when the concept 
of sovereignty was absolute, and it shall not be applied in present times, when 
the concept of sovereignty is relativized, particularly on fields such as human 
rights and environmental protection. The institution of judges ad hoc is not 
compatible with the attempts to set up an international system based on coo-
peration, harmony and interdependence, when the rights do not belong only 
to States, but also when the international society imposes duties to all nations.
In spite of that, it is also useful stressing that, for the reason of being for 
a long time the only international court with a universal scope, the ICJ Statute 
(1945) had a deep influence on a great amount of statutes of contemporary 
international organisms with jurisdictional range, spreading the institution of 
judges ad hoc on several international jurisdictional institutions.
B) the iNterNAtioNAl triBuNAl of the lAw of the seA 
Many jurisdictional international organs were deeply influenced by the 
ICJ Statute, which brought up the classic institution of judges ad hoc. 
This is the case, exempli gratia, of the ITLOS22, which is able to resolve 
controversies sprang up of the interpretation or application of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed at Montego Bay. 
20 Mello (2001) p. 647. 
  ICJ Statute, article 31: “1. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their 
right to sit in the case before the Court. / 2. If the Court includes upon the Bench a judge 
of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit as 
judge. Such person shall be chosen preferably from among those persons who have been 
nominated as candidates as provided in articles 4 and 5. / 3. If the Court includes upon 
the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to 
choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this article”.
21 Martins (1998) p. 14.
22 Barral (2004) p. 90. 
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 On the ITLOS, when one of its 21 judges23 is a national of one of the parties, 
he/she is still able to judge, retaining his/her original and regular competence. 
The other litigant party, however, has the right to point a judge ad hoc. When 
there is no national judge on a particular litis, both parties are able to nominate 
one judge ad hoc of their own trust.24
Furthermore, the ITLOS´s Statute guarantees isonomy between regular 
judges and judges ad hoc, regarding subjects such as remuneration25, incompa-
tible activities26, conditions relating to participation27, privileges, immunities28, 
oath29, among others30, which will be better described on a posterior chapter 
on this study.
c) the iNter-AmericAN court of humAN rights 
The ICHR is an international independent permanent tribunal placed in 
Costa Rica and part of the system of the Organization of the American States. 
Its main scope is preserving and boosting fundamental human rights on the 
American ambit. 
The treatment of judges ad hoc in the ICHR31 is exactly the same which 
happens in the ICJ and in the ITLOS. There are also statements about the gua-
23 reZek (2002) p. 357.
24 Cfr. ITLOS Statute, article 17: “1. Members of the Tribunal of the nationality of any of 
the parties to a dispute shall retain their right to participate as members of the Tribunal. 
2. If the Tribunal, when hearing a dispute, includes upon the bench a member of the 
nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to participate as a 
member of the Tribunal. 3. If the Tribunal, when hearing a dispute, does not include upon 
the bench a member of the nationality of the parties, each of those parties may choose a 
person to participate as a member of the Tribunal”.
25 Vid. Ídem., article 18.4.
26 Vid. Ídem., article 7.
27 Vid. Ídem., articles 2 and 8.
28 Vid. Ídem., article 10.
29 Vid. Ídem., article 11.
30 Exempli gratia, Ídem., articles 17.4, 17.5, 17.6.
31 Barral (2004) p. 297. 
  ICHR Statute, article 10: “1. If a judge is a national of any of the States Parties to a case 
submitted to the Court, he shall retain his right to hear that case. /2. If one of the judges 
called upon to hear a case is a national of one of the States Parties to the case, any other 
State Party to the case may appoint a person to serve on the Court as an ad hoc judge. / 
3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case, none is a national of the States Parties 
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rantees of equality between the magistrates, besides of rules related to rights, 
duties and responsibilities of judges ad hoc32, which also will be presented on 
a posterior chapter on this article.
d) europeAN court of humAN rights 
The ECHR, based in Strasbourg and bound to the Council of Europe, is an 
international jurisdictional organ responsible to assure the rights stated on the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1950.33
In cases related to a specific State, the judge pointed by it must be part of the 
Committee or the Chamber competent to settle that controversy. Nevertheless, 
when the national judge is not able to serve as a judge on that specific case, 
for any reason, the State has the faculty to nominate a judge ad hoc.34
to the case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge. Should several States have the 
same interest in the case, they shall be regarded as a single party for purposes of the above 
provisions. In case of doubt, the Court shall decide. / 4. The right of any State to appoint an 
ad hoc judge shall be considered relinquished if the State should fail to do so within thirty 
days following the written request from the President of the Court. / 5. The provisions of 
articles 4, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the present Statute shall apply to ad hoc judges”.
32 Exempli gratia, in the ICHR Statute, articles 2 (qualifications), 11 (oath), 15 (immunities 
and privileges), 16 (service), 17 (emoluments), 18 (incompatibilities), 19 (disqualification), 
20 (disciplinary regime).
33 guillauMe (1992) p. 17.
34 This rule is stated on the article 27, paragraph 2, European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: “1. To consider cases brought before it, the 
Court shall sit in committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand 
Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court’s Chambers shall set up committees for a fixed 
period of time. / 2. There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber the judge elected in respect of the State Party concerned or, if there is none or if 
he is unable to sit, a person of its choice who shall sit in the capacity of judge”. 
  The discipline of judges ad hoc on the ECHR is also expressed on the ECHR Statute, 
article 29: “1. (a) If the judge elected in respect of a Contracting Party concerned is 
unable to sit in the Chamber, withdraws, or is exempted, or if there is none, the President 
of the Chamber shall invite that Party to indicate within thirty days whether it wishes to 
appoint to sit as judge either another elected judge or an ad hoc judge and, if so, to state 
at the same time the name of the person appointed. /(b) The same rule shall apply if the 
person so appointed is unable to sit or withdraws. / (c) An ad hoc judge shall possess 
the qualifications required by article 21 § 1 of the Convention, must not be unable to sit 
in the case on any of the grounds referred to in Rule 28 of these Rules, and must be in a 
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  Furthermore, many other articles of the eChr Statute refer to that norm, 
ensuring the real effet utile of that main rule. Exempli gratia, article 1335 prohibits 
a national from one of the parties to act as the President of a Section/Chamber 
and article 1 (i)36 guarantees the equality between regular judges and the ad 
hoc ones, what is confirmed by other rules, as the ones contained on articles 
1 (h) and 5, paragraph 4.37
e) other iNterNAtioNAl orgANs used to the settlemeNt of disputes 
In spite of not having particular rules concerning to the designation of 
judges ad hoc -the main facet of this research- it is useful stressing that many 
international organizations with the scope to settle disputes deal with questions 
related to the nationality of the judges and arbitrators as a relevant matter.
a) The European Court of Justice 
On the ECJ there are absolutely no restrictions concerning to the jud-
ges´ nationalities, based on the continuous strengthening of trust on their 
position to meet the demands of availability and attendance provided for in paragraph 5 
of this Rule. / 2. The Contracting Party concerned shall be presumed to have waived its 
right of appointment if it does not reply within thirty days or by the end of any extension 
of that time granted by the President of the Chamber. The Contracting Party concerned 
shall also be presumed to have waived its right of appointment if it twice appoints as ad 
hoc judge persons who the Chamber finds do not satisfy the conditions laid down in 
paragraph 1 (c) of this Rule. / 3. The President of the Chamber may decide not to invite 
the Contracting Party concerned to make an appointment under paragraph 1 (a) of this 
Rule until notice of the application is given to it under Rule 54 § 2 of these Rules. In that 
event, pending any appointment by it, the Contracting Party concerned shall be deemed 
to have appointed the first substitute judge to sit in place of the elected judge. / 4. An ad 
hoc judge shall, at the beginning of the first sitting held to consider the case after the judge 
has been appointed, take the oath or make the solemn declaration provided for in Rule 3. 
This act shall be recorded in minutes. / 5. Ad hoc judges are required to make themselves 
available to the Court and, subject to Rule 26 § 2, to attend the meetings of the Chamber”.
35 ECHR Statute, article 13: “Judges of the Court may not preside in cases in which the 
Contracting Party of which they are nationals or in respect of which they were elected is 
a party, or in cases where they sit as a judge appointed by virtue of Rule 29 § 1(a) or Rule 
30 § 1 of these Rules”.
36 Ídem., article 1 (i): “The terms “judge” and “judges” mean the judges elected by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or ad hoc judges”.
37 Ídem., article 5, paragraph 4: “Ad hoc judges shall take precedence after the elected 
judges according to age”.
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independence and impartiality. There is no rule precluding a judge neither to 
decide on a case involving his State of origin nor to compel the presence of a 
national judge on a certain bench.38
b) International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court is responsible to adjudicate individuals 
who are accused of the gravest crimes on the international level, as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide. 
The Rome Statute, which constituted the International Criminal Court, 
brings no specific rule concerning “national judges”, what, in practice, has the 
effect to allow the participation of nationals on judgements and to preclude 
the designation of judges ad hoc.
c) The World Trade Organization 
The WTO´s dispute settlement system has jurisdiction to decide about 
controversies related to its members and derived from agreements signed on 
the WTO´s sphere, including the constitutive one.39 
38 guillauMe (1992) p. 26. 
  The statute of the ECJ clearly states that: “article 18: No Judge or Advocate General 
may take part in the disposal of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent 
or adviser or has acted for one of the parties, or in which he has been called upon to 
pronounce as a member of a court or tribunal, of a commission of inquiry or in any 
other capacity. If, for some special reason, any Judge or Advocate General considers that 
he should not take part in the judgment or examination of a particular case, he shall so 
inform the President. If, for some special reason, the President considers that any Judge or 
Advocate General should not sit or make submissions in a particular case, he shall notify 
him accordingly. Any difficulty arising as to the application of this article shall be settled by 
decision of the Court. A party may not apply for a change in the composition of the Court 
or of one of its chambers on the grounds of either the nationality of a Judge or the absence 
from the Court or from the chamber of a Judge of the nationality of that party”.
39 dreyZin de klor et al. (2004)
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Besides being independent from their States of origin40, on the Panel’s struc-
ture of the WTO nationals simply cannot analyze cases when their countries 
of origin are parts41, unless there is an expressed agreement of the parties.42
To avoid criticisms that the WTO structure is dominated by developed 
countries, and to improve the legitimation of the WTO´s system43, however, 
some measures have been taken, as, for example, the right assured to develo-
ping countries - involved on a controversy against a developed country – to 
require the nomination of a Panel’s member who is national from another 
developing State.44 
d) MERCOSUL
In the MERCOSUL´s dispute settlement, the arbitral Tribunal should be 
constituted by three arbitrors. Each member of the controversy is able to nominate 
one of them, and the third one must not be a national from any of the parties.45
e) International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes46
The Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States 
and nationals of other States (Washington Convention, of 1965) imposes rele-
vant rules concerning to arbitral proceedings. 
40 Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes 
Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, Art. 8 (9): “Panelists shall serve in their individual 
capacities and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any 
organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor seek to 
influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a panel”.
41 Barral (2004) p. 47.
42 noronha (1991) p. 63.
  In accordance with the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of disputes (Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement), article 8 (3): “Citizens of Members whose 
governments are parties to the dispute or third parties as defined in paragraph 2 of article 
10 shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute, unless the parties to the dispute 
agree otherwise”.
43 MerCurio (2004) p. 811.
44 Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (Annex 2 of 
the WTO Agreement), article 8 (10): “When a dispute is between a developing country 
Member and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the developing country 
Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing country Member”.
45 BeChara (2001) p. 48. 
46 Hunter and redFern (1986) p. 32.
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The arbitral tribunals should be composed by an uneven number of arbitra-
tors or by a sole one, nominated by the parties. The majority of arbitrators must 
not be nationals of the State which is a party; neither have the same nationality 
of the other party, unless whether both parties agree on that.47 As usually the 
tribunals are composed by three members, in praxis, national arbitrators could 
be pointed only through a consensus.48 
Furthermore, in accordance to the ICSID rules, when it is necessary for 
the Chairman to nominate the members of a Tribunal, he is not able to choose 
them among nationals of the State party neither of the State whose national 
is a party.49 
f) The International Chamber of Commerce 
The ICC, placed in Paris, is one of the world’s most important organs in 
offering the administration of international arbitral proceedings.
Under the ICC rules it is allowed that each party on a controversy desig-
nates a co-arbitrator, who may be chosen without restrictions concerning to 
nationality. However, when nominating a sole arbitrator or the Chairman, the 
ICC rules recommend indicating a non-national arbitrator. Nevertheless, when 
it is not possible to act in conformity to that recommendation, or when the 
circumstances allow and there is no opposition from any party, it is possible 
nominating a national member. It is important stressing that, accordingly to the 
47 leW et al. (2003) p. 784.
48 Vid. Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of 
other States, article 39: “The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other 
than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national 
is a party to the dispute; provided, however, that the foregoing provisions of this article 
shall not apply if the sole arbitrator or each individual member of the Tribunal has been 
appointed by agreement of the parties”.
49 Vid. Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals 
of other States, article 38: “If the Tribunal shall not have been constituted within 90 days 
after notice of registration of the request has been dispatched by the Secretary-General in 
accordance with paragraph (3) of article 36, or such other period as the parties may agree, 
the Chairman shall, at the request of either party and after consulting both parties as far as 
possible, appoint the arbitrator or arbitrators not yet appointed.
  Arbitrators appointed by the Chairman pursuant to this article shall not be nationals of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute or of the Contracting State whose national is a party 
to the dispute”.
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ICC rules, when one party does not point its co-arbitrator, the ICC will nomi-
nate one, rather among the nationals of the country where the party is from.50 
g) The UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration
The UNCITRAL Model Law states that there must be no restrictions con-
cerning to the nationality of the arbitrators, but, coherently with its scope of 
liberalization of the arbitral structure in accordance to the parties´ will, an 
agreement may preclude the actuation of nationals on the composition of an 
arbitral tribunal.51
Nonetheless, when an authority must appoint a sole arbitrator or a Chairman, 
the article 11.5 states that this nomination must be preferably among arbitrators 
of a nationality different from the parties.52
50 ICC rules, article 9: “(5) The sole arbitrator or the chairman of the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be of a nationality other than those of the parties. However, in 
suitable circumstances and provided that neither of the parties objects within 
the time limit fixed by the Court, the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the 
Arbitral Tribunal may be chosen from a country of which any of the parties is a national. (6) 
Where the Court is to appoint an arbitrator on behalf of a party which has failed to 
nominate one, it shall make the appointment upon a proposal of the National Committee 
of the country of which that party is a national. If the Court does not accept the proposal 
made, or if the National Committee fails to make the proposal requested within the time 
limit fixed by the Court, or if the country of which the said party is a national has no 
National Committee, the Court shall be at liberty to choose any person whom it regards as 
suitable. The Secretariat shall inform the National Committee, if one exists, of the country 
of which such person is a national”.
51 UNCITRAL model law on international commercial arbitration, Chapter III, article 11 – 
(1): “No person shall be precluded by reason of his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties”. 
52 Ídem., article 11 (5): “The Court or other authority, in appointing an arbitrator, shall have 
due regard to any qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties 
and to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an independent 
and impartial arbitrator and, in the case of sole or third arbitrator, shall take into account 
as well the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than those of the 
parties”.
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II. THE CONTEMPORARY TREATMENT OF THE SUBJECT 
1. Rights and duties of judges ad hoc 
Judges ad hoc must receive the same treatment dispensed to regular jud-
ges53, and that is assured by the main Court’s Statutes.54
This equality is applied for rights, duties and responsibilities55, common 
to all categories of magistrates in the international level, and reflected in parti-
cular topics concerning, exempli gratia, the requirements for their nomination, 
the incompatibilities, their immunities and privileges, their earnings and the 
requisiteness of a solemn oath. 
A) requiremeNts 
To be designated as a judge ad hoc, the candidate must fulfill the same 
requirements56 which are necessary to be elected as a regular judge on an 
International Court.57 Those high standards are usually the same that are required 
to exercise the highest judicial functions under municipal laws, exempli gratia, 
to be a member of a Supreme Court. 
53 Mosquera (1988) p. 33. 
54 ITLOS Statute, article 17.6: “They shall They shall participate in the decision on terms of 
complete equality with their colleagues”; ICJ Statute, article 31, paragraph 6 : “Judges 
chosen as laid down in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of this article shall fulfill the conditions 
required by articles 2, 17 (paragraph 2), 20, and 24 of the present Statute. They shall take 
part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues”. 
55 ICHR Statute, article 20: “In the performance of their duties and at all other times, the 
judges and staff of the Court shall conduct themselves in a manner that is in keeping 
with the office of those who perform an international judicial function. They shall be 
answerable to the Court for their conduct, as well as for any violation, act of negligence or 
omission committed in the exercise of their functions. 2. The OAS General Assembly shall 
have disciplinary authority over the judges, but may exercise that authority only at the 
request of the Court itself, composed for this purpose of the remaining judges. The Court 
shall inform the General Assembly of the reasons for its request. 3. Disciplinary authority 
over the Secretary shall lie with the Court, and over the rest of the staff, with the Secretary, 
who shall exercise that authority with the approval of the President.4. The Court shall issue 
disciplinary rules, subject to the administrative regulations of the OAS General Secretariat 
in so far as they may be applicable in accordance with article 59 of the Convention”.
56 sChWeBel (1999) p. 325.
57 SCoBBie (2005) p. 427.
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There is no rule compelling States to constitute an own national to serve as 
a judge ad hoc. In fact, frequently smaller and/or least developed States point 
foreign judges of their trust to act in specific cases, as judges ad hoc. 
Some international tribunals allow that a State points a judge ad hoc re-
gardless to his/her nationality58, as what happens in the ICJ59 and in the ECHR.60 
On the other hand, there are courts with specific criteria, such as the iChr61, 
that obliges the States to appoint a national of an Organization of American 
States (OAS) member.62 
Judges ad hoc must be independent63 on the exercise of their functions, 
being autonomous and impartial, just as titular judges. A judge ad hoc is not 
representing a government or a State64, he/she is “merely” a judge.
 Also, judges ad hoc must possess recognized competence65 on the field 
that he will judge66, usually with a high reputation on the academic area, or 
experience occupying high offices on the internal judicial structure.67
58 arauJo (2002) p. 46. 
59 ICJ Statute, article 2: “The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, 
elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who 
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in international 
law”.
60 Barral (2004) p. 279.
61 ICHR Statute, article 4: “The Court shall consist of seven judges, nationals of the member 
states of the OAS, elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest moral 
authority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights, who possess the 
qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions under the law of 
the State of which they are nationals or of the State that proposes them as candidates”.
62 nieto (1993) p. 76. 
63 ITLOS Statute, article 2.1: “The Tribunal shall be composed of a body of 21 independent 
members, elected from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and 
integrity and of recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea”.
64 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
article 21.2: “The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity”.
65 Carnelutti (2002) p. 255.
66 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
article 21.1 “The judges shall be of high moral character and must either possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of 
recognized competence”.
67 Mosquera (1988) p. 35. 
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Moreover, it is necessary that judges ad hoc have “high moral authority”, 
“reputation for fairness and integrity”. Those are abstract concepts, but they 
try to ensure the Court’s legitimation with the presence of members which are 
capable to emit fair and reliable sentences. 
B) iNcompAtiBilities
Judges ad hoc, as the regular ones, are not able to be involved in any kind 
of activity which is not compatible with their independence, dignity, prestige 
or impartiality.68 
Exempli gratia, a jurist cannot participate of a case as a judge ad hoc in 
which he/she, or someone close to him/her, have direct interest, or in one in 
which he already participated as an attorney, consultant, judge, or “in any other 
68 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
article 21.3: “During their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity which 
is incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time 
office; all questions arising from the application of this paragraph shall be decided by 
the Court.” article 19: “1. Judges may not take part in matters in which, in the opinion of 
the Court, they or members of their family have a direct interest or in which they have 
previously taken part as agents, counsel or advocates, or as members of a national or 
international court or an investigatory committee, or in any other capacity.2. If a judge is 
disqualified from hearing a case or for some other appropriate reason considers that he 
should not take part in a specific matter, he shall advise the President of his disqualification. 
Should the latter disagree, the Court shall decide.3. If the President considers that a judge 
has cause for disqualification or for some other pertinent reason should not take part in a 
given matter, he shall advise him to that effect. Should the judge in question disagree, the 
Court shall decide.4. When one or more judges are disqualified pursuant to this article, 
the President may request the States Parties to the Convention, in a meeting of the OAS 
Permanent Council, to appoint interim judges to replace them”.
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capacity”.69 Political, administrative70 or commercial71 relationships with the 
object of the controversy would also put under suspection his/her decisions 
and deslegitimate the Court as a whole. The judges, by their own, may also 
allege other reasons to not be assigned on a specific demand. The cases of 
incompatibility must be decided by the respective Courts.
69 ICJ Statute, article 16: “1. No member of the Court may exercise any political or 
administrative function, or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature. 2. 
Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court”. article 17: “1. No 
member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. 2. No member 
may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, 
counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a national or international 
court, or of a commission of enquiry, or in any other capacity. 3. Any doubt on this point 
shall be settled by the decision of the Court”.
70 ICHR Statute, article 18: “1. The position of judge of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights is incompatible with the following positions and activities: a. Members or high-
ranking officials of the executive branch of government, except for those who hold positions 
that do not place them under the direct control of the executive branch and those of 
diplomatic agents who are not Chiefs of Missions to the OAS or to any of its member states; 
b. Officials of international organizations; c. Any others that might prevent the judges from 
discharging their duties, or that might affect their independence or impartiality, or the 
dignity and prestige of the office.2. In case of doubt as to incompatibility, the Court shall 
decide. If the incompatibility is not resolved, the provisions of article 73 of the Convention 
and article 20(2) of the present Statute shall apply.3. Incompatibilities may lead only to 
dismissal of the judge and the imposition of applicable liabilities, but shall not invalidate 
the acts and decisions in which the judge in question participated”.
71 ITLOS Statute, article 7: “1. No member of the Tribunal may exercise any political or 
administrative function, or associate actively with or be financially interested in any of 
the operations of any enterprise concerned with the exploration for or exploitation of the 
resources of the sea or the seabed or other commercial use of the sea or the seabed. 2. No 
member of the Tribunal may act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case. 3. Any doubt 
on these points shall be resolved by decision of the majority of the other members of the 
Tribunal present.” article 8: “1. No member of the Tribunal may participate in the decision 
of any case in which he has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one of 
the parties, or as a member of a national or international court or tribunal, or in any other 
capacity. 2. If, for some special reason, a member of the Tribunal considers that he should 
not take part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President of the 
Tribunal. 3. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of 
the Tribunal should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly. 4. Any 
doubt on these points shall be resolved by decision of the majority of the other members 
of the Tribunal present”.
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c) immuNities ANd privileges
Judges ad hoc must receive exactly the same diplomatic immunities72 
which are offered to the other judges73, while they are exercising their functions 
in an international Court. 74 
d) oAth 
All members of the Court, including judges ad hoc75, must make a public 
solemn declaration, promising that they will exercise their functions impartially 
and independently76, exercising their legal powers conscientiously77, keeping 
72 Mello (2001).
73 ghevontian (1992) p. 137.
  ICHR Statute, article 15: “The judges of the Court shall enjoy, from the moment of their 
election and throughout their term of office, the immunities extended to diplomatic agents 
under international law. During the exercise of their functions, they shall, in addition, enjoy 
the diplomatic privileges necessary for the performance of their duties. 2. At no time shall 
the judges of the Court be held liable for any decisions or opinions issued in the exercise 
of their functions. 3. The Court itself and its staff shall enjoy the privileges and immunities 
provided for in the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of 
American States, of May 15, 1949, mutatis mutandis, taking into account the importance 
and independence of the Court. 4. The provision of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this article 
shall apply to the States Parties to the Convention. They shall also apply to such other 
member states of the OAS as expressly accept them, either in general or for specific cases. 
5. The system of privileges and immunities of the judges of the Court and of its staff may 
be regulated or supplemented by multilateral or bilateral agreements between the Court, 
the OAS and its member States”. 
74 ITLOS Statute, article 10: “The members of the Tribunal, when engaged on the business of 
the Tribunal, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities”, ICJ Statute, article 19: “The 
members of the Court, when engaged on the business of the Court, shall enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities”.
75 Mosquera (1988).
76 ITLOS Statute, article 11: “Every member of the Tribunal shall, before taking up his duties, 
make a solemn declaration in open session that he will exercise his powers impartially and 
conscientiously”.
77 ICJ Statute, article 20: “Every member of the Court shall, before taking up his duties, 
make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and 
conscientiously”.
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secret when it is necessary.78 This oath makes all judges legally and morally 
bound to act without any kind of partisanship.79
e) remuNerAtioN
Judges ad hoc must be remunerated accordingly to their functions, usually 
by the number of days80 dedicated to a judgement81, on a value correspondently 
to the earning of the other judges.82 
2. Judges ad hoc and consultive competences
The international permanent Courts, besides their regular competence with 
jurisdictional character (settlement of controversies, solving a specific litis), have 
also competency over consultive issues. This competence83 is provided, exem-
pli gratia, on the statutes of the ICJ84, the ICHR85, the ECHR86 and the ITLOS87.
That consultive competence is not bound to any specific case, but it is 
a discussion, in abstratu, about the elucidation of possible interpretations of 
International Law. On the ICJ, for example, this consultive task is realized by 
78 ICHR Statute, article 11: “1. Upon assuming office, each judge shall take the following 
oath or make the following solemn declaration: “I swear” - or “I solemnly declare” - “that 
I shall exercise my functions as a judge honorably, independently and impartially and that 
I shall keep secret all deliberations.” 2. The oath shall be administered by the President of 
the Court and, if possible, in the presence of the other judges”.
79 sChWeBel (1999) p. 327. 
80 ICJ Statute, article 32: “4. The judges chosen under article 31, other than members of the 
Court, shall receive compensation for each day on which they exercise their functions”.
81 ITLOS Statute, article 18.4 : “The members chosen under article 17 of this Annex, other 
than elected members of the Tribunal, shall receive compensation for each day on which 
they exercise their functions”.
82 ICHR Statute, article 17: “The ad hoc judges shall receive the emoluments established by 
Regulations, within the limits of the Court’s budget”.
83 reZek (2002) p. 355.
84 Mello (2001) p. 653 
85 Barral (2004) p. 298. 
86 Ídem. p. 284.
87 Ídem. p. 100.
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request of the UN General Assembly, the Security Council or other organs and 
specialized bodies88 which are authorized to inquire those legal briefs.89
Notwithstanding, it is worthy pointing out that it is not rare that those who 
bring a case in abstratu before the Courts, are interested, de facto, in establish-
ing a Tribunal’s understanding for a later use in a certain concrete situation.
Then, commonly, various States have a special stake on the resolution of 
a consultive opinion in one direction or another. The question presented, on 
those conflicts, is whether those States have or not the right to indicate a judge 
ad hoc to assist on its resolution. 
There is an explicit rule, stated on article 102, paragraph 3, of ICJ´s Rules90, 
that compels the utilization of the norms related to judges ad hoc91 when the 
consultive function is bound with a legal controversy which is pending between 
two or more States.92
Even so, this rule has not been applied, in praxis, by the Court. This hypoth-
esis was already analyzed by the ICJ when South Africa presented a solicitation 
to put up a judge ad hoc on the Namibia Advisory Opinion93, because of the 
fact that the decision of that consultive issue would have a huge impact on the 
resolution of a causa in concretu, the Namibia case, pending between South 
Africa and Namibia.
The ICJ´s conclusion was in the sense of denying this possibility to South 
Africa94, alleging that article 31 was not applied to all proceedings which have 
88 Exempli gratia, the International Labour Organization (ILO); the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the World Health Organization (WHO); 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
89 ghevontian (1992) p. 138.
90 ICJ´s Rules, article 102, par. 3: “When an advisory opinion is requested upon a legal 
question actually pending between two or more States, article 31 of the Statute shall 
apply, as also the provisions of these Rules concerning the application of that article”. 
91 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p. 182. 
92 Mello (2001) p. 653, sCoBBie (2005) p. 436. 
93 sCoBBie (2005) p. 437
94 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(1971): “The fact that, in order to give its answer, the Court might have to pronounce on 
legal questions upon which divergent views exist between South Africa and the United 
Nations does not convert the case into a dispute between States. (There was therefore no 
necessity to apply article 83 of the Rules of Court, according to which, if an advisory opinion 
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consultive character, but only for those which deals about “a legal question 
actually pending between two or more States”. Furthermore, the ICJ´s conclu-
sion about the definition of “legal questions actually pending” is very strict.95 
For the Court, it is necessary a strictu sensu interpretation to avoid that the 
Tribunal’s consultive competence becomes a real non-sanctionative instance in 
concrete contentious cases. And so, the Court justifies the non-interference of 
judges ad hoc on those cases because the subject analyzed on the attribution 
of its consultive competence is merely hypothetical, without the investigation 
of concrete facts, what, in practice, is a conditio sine qua non for the charac-
terization and recognition of a “national interest”.
Data maxima venia, which is not the best understanding about the theme. 
Applying article 68 of the ICJ´s Statute96, the conclusion is that the inclusion or 
not of judges ad hoc is a matter of Tribunal’s discretionary competence.
 On this sense, it was presented the dissident opinion stated by Judge 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, in the Namibia case.97
The Court’s preponderant posture, however, is on the sense that the allow-
ance of the participation of judges ad hoc is not a discretional measure, precisely 
because inserting judges is not a provision which is applied in contentious cases. 
The Tribunal’s understanding is -once more- restrictive, since the ICJ interprets 
that “provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases” are 
in fact provisions which apply exclusively in contentious cases. Thus, because 
it is a topic concerning to the Tribunal’s organization, the application of article 
31 would not be included on the Court’s discretionary competence, what, in 
practice, vetoes the nomination of judges ad hoc, unless when it is configured 
the hypothesis of article 102, paragraph 3, when, more than a special interest 
of a party, it is at risk the essence of a certain litis.98
is requested upon a legal question “actually pending between two or more States”, article 
31 of the Statute, dealing with judges ad hoc, is applicable; the Government of South 
Africa having requested leave to choose a judge ad hoc, the Court heard its observations 
on that point on 27 January 1971 but, in the light of the above considerations, decided by 
the Order of 29 January 1971 not to accede to that request)”.
95 heinZe and FitZMauriCe (1998) p. 377. 
96 ICJ Statute, article 68: “In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be 
guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the 
extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable”.
97 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p. 182. 
98 Ídem. pp. 182 y 183.
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The consultive competence of the international courts could be improved, 
converting it on an efficient mechanism for the protection and uniformization 
of principles of International Law.99 There is no inconvenient to admit judges 
ad hoc in consultive tasks, because the decision is not binding, the principle of 
juge naturel is not applicable and the decision is in abstratu. Therefore, it seems 
to be natural and worthy to extend the legitimacy of the decisions accepting 
the nomination of judges ad hoc, which are representing different points of 
view, and may contribute a lot to the continuous development of this legal area. 
3. The nomination of judges ad hoc as a faculty of the parties
It is significant noting that the permission given to a State to designate a 
judge of its own trust for a specific case (ad hoc) in concretu must never be 
converted on an obligation to nominate a judge.
In other words, the rule that allows the assignment of judges ad hoc has the 
status of a faculty, a discretionary power that can be exercised or not. As long 
as legal requirements are fulfilled, the nomination of judges ad hoc is qualified 
as a unilateral act, a single manifestation of the State’s will which must not 
be bound neither to the Court’s actuation nor to the contrary part’s conducts.
When one of the States parties on a controversy has already an own na-
tional among the regular judges and the other party does not appoint a judge 
ad hoc for serving on that litis, the permanent judge must remain on his posi-
tion. There is no reason to preclude a regular judge because of the individual 
conduct of one of the parties. 
Nevertheless, there could be a situation when both parties have the right 
to constitute a judge ad hoc. There are no problems if no party decides to cons-
titute a national judge.100 However, there would be a great controversy if only 
one of the litigants wants to exercise this faculty. That hypothesis was already 
presented to the ICJ at the Aegean Sea case, when both parties had the right 
to point a judge ad hoc for the litis, but while Turkey effectively nominated a 
judge ad hoc, Greece preferred not to designate one. 
On this case, justifiably, the Court decided to consent that the Turkish 
judge should be able to exercise normally his role, because the discretionary 
power non-exerted by one party must not harm the other party to put in use 
99 viCuña (2004) p. 20. 
100 sChWeBel (1999) p. 329.
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its own right.101 Otherwise, the right to nominate a judge ad hoc would not be 
considered discretionary, but conditioned or subordinated to the behavior of 
the contrary party on a litis.
4. Provisional measures
Because of their urgent character (periculum in mora), it is possible to 
an international Court to decide about a provisional measure102 even before 
the nomination of judges ad hoc.103 Provisional measures are temporary, and 
besides being legally binding (La Grand case), may be granted even inaudita 
altera parte, because their scope is assuring the process’s effet utile.
That was already the understanding of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, and it is, nowadays, a consensus on the jurisprudence of the main 
contemporary Courts.
III. REASONS USUALLY USED TO JUSTIFY THE INSTITUTION OF JUDGES 
AD HOC 
1. Legitimation of the process
On Bobbio´s definition, legitimacy consists on the presence, in a signi-
ficative part of the population, of a consensus degree which is able to assure 
the obedience without the necessity of recurring to the use of force, unless on 
sporadic cases. That is the reason why every power tries to achieve the consensus 
being recognized as legitime, converting obeisance in adherence.104 When this 
definition is applied on the field of International Law, it is easily remarkable 
that the consensus which is necessary to assure the efficaciousness of an in-
ternational sentence is a real conditio sine qua non to justify the existence of 
an international jurisdictional order. It is precisely the States´ adhesion to the 
international legal system and their submissiveness to the International Law 
which justify the existence of International Tribunals. 
101 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p. 181. 
102 ICJ Statute, article 41: “The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that 
circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve 
the respective rights of either party. (...)”; ITLOS Statute, article 25: “In accordance 
with article 290, the Tribunal and its Seabed Disputes Chamber shall have the power to 
prescribe provisional measures (...)”.
103 ridrueJo (1962) p. 233.
104 BoBBio (2000) p. 675.
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In other words, in a jurisdictional system which requires the States’ consent 
to make possible bringing a case relative to it under international Tribunals, 
simply there is no obedience to the Tribunal’s imperatives without a previous 
adherence to the system. This prior attachment to the international legal order, 
on the same time, requests and guarantees the legitimacy of the system as a 
whole.
This previous consent increases the system’s credibility because the States´ 
participation on the international Courts make the decisions more legitimate, 
representing the consensus of a larger number of States. At the same time, the 
prior consent is conditioned by the system’s legitimacy, because, following 
the Weber´s thought105, a State will never be submitted to the jurisdiction of a 
Tribunal which it believes is not lawful.
Therefore, it is remarkable the huge importance of assuring the legitimacy 
of the decisions on international tribunals, because it is crucial to a permanent 
development on an international legal system with a universalizing scope.
The first step to insure the international Court’s legitimacy is ensuring 
that the parties feel represented by it, better said, that the parties trust that 
their points of view and particularities will be taken in account on the Court’s 
proceedings and resolutions.
For that, it is necessary to break up with the old European and North 
American traditions on those Courts, ensuring the effective representation of 
the other legal systems. That is the reason of several contemporary criticisms 
suffered by many international dispute settlement systems, specially from 
African and Asiatic States.106
The increment of representativity, however, is not only interest of the States 
which have no members on the regular composition of the Courts, but also it 
is a worry of the in Tribunals and of the international society as a whole.
A first topic in the search of a real multilateral legal view, assuring an 
expressive and well-balanced geopolitical representativeness is the fact that 
the main international Courts present proportional systems on the judges´ 
election.107 On the ICJ, exempli gratia, it is prohibited that two individuals of 
105 CadeMartori (1999) p. 95. 
106 Mello (2001) p. 649. 
107 Exempli gratia, the ITLOS Statute, article 2 (2): “In the Tribunal as a whole the representation 
of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution shall 
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the same nationality serve as judges at the same time, and, furthermore, the 
Court’s composition must reflect the world’s main legal systems.108
Notwithstanding, it is worthy pointing that the representativeness and 
identification109 from the parties with the Tribunals does not come from the 
mere geopolitical composition of benches. The legitimacy, accordingly to a 
habermasian perspective110, would be dependent on the Tribunal’s ability to 
promote agreements, with an effective application of a juridical order able to 
respect the regional particularities, attesting the nonpartisanship and autonomy 
of those Courts, insuring the efficaciousness of the decisions, stimulating the 
States´ adherence and obedience. 
On this context, it is relevant the analysis about the role of judges ad hoc 
on the legitimation of the international legal order.
From any theoretical framework adopted as a reference to analyze the 
concept of legitimacy on the international courts, it is remarkable that it is 
never dependent on the existence or not of judges ad hoc. 
The main argument to defend the legitimacy of the international jurisdic-
tion comes from the impartiality of the judges, not from their nationalities. It 
would be unconceivable a legitimated legal system without autonomous and 
unprejudiced judges when exercising their jurisdictional functions.
be assured”, article 3 (2): “There shall be no fewer than three members from each 
geographical group as established by the General Assembly of the United Nations”. Also, 
International Criminal Court Statute, article 36: “7. La Cour ne peut comprendre plus d’un 
ressortissant du même État. (...) 8. a) Dans le choix des juges, les États Parties tiennent 
compte de la nécessité d’assurer, dans la composition de la Cour : i) La représentation des 
principaux systèmes juridiques du monde; ii) Une représentation géographique équitable; 
et iii) Une représentation équitable des hommes et des femmes; b) Les États Parties 
tiennent également compte de la nécessité d’assurer la présence de juges spécialisés dans 
certaines matières, y compris, mais sans s’y limiter, les questions liées à la violence contre 
les femmes ou les enfants». 
108 ICJ Statute, article 9: “At every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only that the 
persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also 
that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systems of the world should be assured”.
109 leWisCh (2003) p. 447.
110 CadeMartori (1999) p. 125. 
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It may be true that nowadays the constitution of judges ad hoc could 
stimulate the States´access to international Courts, on a paradigm strongly 
marked by the consent. 
Nevertheless, certainly the decisions taken by those Courts would be, 
anyhow, “contaminated” by an apparentness of partiality. It is not only about 
being independent and impartial; it must necessarily look like it.111
International judges often prove to deserve the trust of the whole interna-
tional community with an independent actuation, with a real commitment to 
establish and develop an isonomic and fair international legal order. That is the 
legitimation as a constant construction, accordingly to Luhmann´s proposition.112 
We must trust on our judges, on the contrary, we should abolish interna-
tional Tribunals, which would become senseless. If there is a lack of confidence 
on the international legal system, there is no doubt that this situation should 
not be permanent and legitimated, it must be modified.
The constitution of judges ad hoc, on this perspective, is a way to decrease 
the merit on the performance of the regular judges and specially, it puts in doubt 
the nonpartisanship of the permanent judges who are nationals of one of the 
parties on a controversy. The idea raised to the international society with the 
designation of those members ad hoc is that a national judge would be more 
qualified to decide fairer than his peers.113
 Should an Italian be afraid of being judged by and Mexican? In the same 
idea, on the internal plan, should a muslim be afraid of being judged by a ca-
tholic? Or, a woman be afraid of being judged by a man? Or, a black citizen 
be afraid of being judged by a white judge? The answers for those questions 
must be negative; otherwise the failure is not on the judges, but on the whole 
legal system.
 It is not the judges´ nationalities, but the trust of the international commu-
nity, allied to the nonpartisanship and independency manifested by the judges 
on the discharge of their functions, the respect for the regional particularities, 
and a good application of international Law which assures the legitimacy of 
the international legal order.
111 Mosquera irurita (1988) p. 34.
112 larenZ (1997) p. 276.
113 League oF Nations / Advisory CoMMittee oF Jurists (1920) p. 531. 
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2. Judges ad hoc are reciprocally annulled 
The existence of ‘partial members’ is a main characteristic of the old 
arbitral tribunals, when each party used to select a partial arbitrator and the 
Chairman was chosen by those two arbitrators.114 Notwithstanding, on the 
contemporary arbitral structure the partial arbitrators were banned115, and the 
members nominated by the parties are necessarily independent.
Some defenders of the existence of judges ad hoc sustain that, in practice, 
they are reciprocally annulled, and the difference will still be the vote of the 
other judges. Of course that supporting this argument is contradictory with the 
affirmation that ad hoc judges are able to act independently from the country 
that designated them.
What comes about, in practice, is that how judges ad hoc are selected 
directly by the litigant parties, States have a great tendency to indicate a jurist 
who has a point of view which will be interesting for them on a decision, as a 
real precondition for its invitation.116 Exempli gratia, if the State wants to defend 
a nationalization, certainly it would be catastrophic to nominate a liberal judge. 
Consequently, it is very frequent that judges ad hoc decide pro their States 
of origin.117 That occurs, however, not derived from impartiality of lack of in-
dependence, of the judges, but in coherence to their prior thoughts. 
On the other hand, the regular judge who is national from one of the parties 
not necessarily has the same legal understanding than his State of origin. Then, 
it is very common that a regular national judge votes against the interests of 
the State of his nationality118, and the “expected” nullification between those 
two judges does not occur.119 
Jurisprudence shows that, in several opportunities, the participation or 
the absence of judges ad hoc was decisive on the resolution of a particular 
controversy. That took place at the Lotus case, at the South West Africa case - 
second phase and at the Customs Regime between Germany and Austria case.120
114 Mello (2001) p. 1386.
115 MurPhy and PritChett (1961) p. 106.
116 sCoBBie (2005) p. 440.
117 sChWeBel (1999) p. 327, sCoBBie (2005) p. 439.
118 sChWeBel (1999) p. 327.
119 Mello (2001) p. 650. 
120 sChWeBel (1999) p. 327, sCoBBie (2005) p. 461.
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Less frequent, nevertheless, is the hypothesis of judges ad hoc who voted 
against the countries that designated them, as happened, exempli gratia, at the 
Arbitral award of the 31 July 1989 case, at the Application of the Convention 
on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide case, at the Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier dispute case, and at the Application for revision 
and interpretation of the judgement of 24 February 1982 in the case concerning 
the Continental Shelf case.121 Those cases show the independence that must be 
applied by judges on international courts. 
This argument, frequently used to support the maintenance of judges ad 
hoc on international courts is, in fact, a proof that the judge’s nationality does 
not (and must not) influence a judgment, being senseless all kinds of prejudice 
against judges of any nationality.
3.  Judges ad hoc are more familiarized with the internal law, circumstan-
ces and customs
There is also an argument that the presence of judges ad hoc could help on 
the interpretation of municipal law, because they would be more familiarized 
with the specificities of one of the parties on a controversy, and they would have 
a better understanding about internal costumes, language and legal practice.122
Primarily, it is necessary apprehending that the main scope of the internatio-
nal courts is the uniformization of international law beyond general principles, 
notwithstanding, respecting the specificities of each region. That is the reason 
of the inclusion of rules, on the statutes of International Courts, enforcing that 
their composition must reflect the most important legal systems in the world, 
being able to understand those different legal points of view. 
So, there is a consensus that the judge’s precise understanding about the 
circumstances of a specific situation on a State, which may be decisive on a 
judgment, is a real conditio sine qua non for the Court’s effet utile in the inter-
national legal system. 
In spite of these considerations, nothing ensures that the nomination of 
judges ad hoc is the best method to inspire the whole Court to understand 
those particularities.
121 sChWeBel (1999) p. 329.
122 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p. 181, Hunter and redFern (1986) p. 158, sCoBBie (2005) p. 
434.
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First of all, in concretu, almost half of the judges ad hoc on the ICJ are not 
nationals of the countries which pointed them123, and not necessarily know the 
country’s internal situation better than the other ones. That situation is similar 
on other international tribunals, and it is more common on issues related to 
small States, which frequently do not have enough qualified staff to act as 
judges on international Courts.
 Of course this fact is distorting the whole international legal system, 
because those small States, which should be the most beneficiaries of the in-
clusion of judges ad hoc, have to nominate foreigners to present their internal 
situation to the other judges. 
Secondly, it is necessary rejecting that a regular judge does not understand 
the situation of other regions. As discussed above, they are selected among 
qualified jurists, and during their experience on Courts they are necessarily 
studying different legal systems, and being presented to different circumstances 
all around the world. It is vital to international judges to integrate themselves on 
a global culture124 and, autonomously, to exercise their jurisdictional powers.125
More than that, there is the argument that the language is, sometimes, 
an obstacle, and translations are not always perfect and may generate some 
trouble for the judges. The Courts, however, have a high-qualified group of 
translators, and there is no doubt about their independence, impartiality and 
commitment with a fair trial.
Thirdly, about the specifities of municipal laws, the principle of the jura 
novit curia is not applicable for international tribunals when the subject regards 
to internal laws. So, it is unconceivable that a national judge must be the per-
son responsible to present or explain the municipal Law to the other judges. 
In an accusative legal system, that is precisely the role of attorneys, who must 
be able to introduce the particularities of internal norms and jurisprudence to 
the international judges, which should take that on account when emitting a 
fair decision.
 And more, if there are uncertainties particularities of national legislations 
or circumstances, it would be perfectly acceptable that the Court simply re-
quires a consultant to help the understanding of the internal juridical systems 
and societies, in the same manner that happens on the internal plan when 
123 sChWeBel (1999) p. 329.
124 Cordero (1987) p. 19.
125 Coutinho (1996) p. 58.
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national judges have to apply international law, exempli gratia, with affidavits 
and legal briefs. This idea of an advisory opinion was already supported by 
Mr. De Lapradelle126 when discussing the PCIJ Statute, in 1920.127 This advisory 
opinion must be a faculty of the Tribunal, asking for independent jurists or legal 
bodies, when the regular judges find useful or necessary.
 The best solution, notwithstanding, seems to be the creation of a perma-
nent body, which should be able to analyze the causes independently from the 
parties and from the judges. Acting free from the judgement´s pression, they 
should be able to state a non-binding opinion which could be very important 
on the resolution of cases, similar to the structure of the ECJ and the nomination 
of the advocates-general.128
This advisory group should be settled by qualified jurists from different 
States, as representative as possible, called ad hoc for the case related to its 
State of origin. That solution would fulfill the requirements to introduce the 
internal specificities to the Court without the harmful presence of the figure of 
judges ad hoc and their lack of legitimation.
4.  Stimulation of the states´ participation on the international legal system
The international legal system is usually based on consent129, it is not 
compulsorily imposed to any State.130 It is always necessary to a State to be in 
accordance to be judged by the international jurisdictional system.131
In accordance to Kelsen´s respectable lesson: “A permanent tribunal may 
have compulsory jurisdiction. Such compulsory jurisdiction exists if the treaty 
establishing the Tribunal imposes upon the contracting parties the obligation 
to recognize the jurisdiction of the tribunal in every case in which they are 
126 league oF Nations / Advisory CoMMittee oF Jurists (1920) p. 535.
127 sCoBBie (2005) p. 430.
128 Barral (2004) p. 161, Consolidated version of the treaty establishing the European 
Community, article 222: “The Court of Justice shall be assisted by eight Advocates-
General. Should the Court of Justice so request, the Council, acting unanimously, may 
increase the number of Advocates-General. It shall be duty of the Advocate-General, 
acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open Court, reasoned 
submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require 
his involvement”.
129 ridrueJo (1962) p. 174.
130 sCoBBie, iain (2005) p. 422.
131 Mello (2001) p. 651.
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involved, whether the case is brought before the Tribunal by one of the parties 
or by an organ of the international community of which the Tribunal is an organ, 
or in any other way determined by the treaty. Under general international law 
no State is obliged to submit a dispute with another State to an international 
Tribunal. Such submission requires agreement of the parties to the dispute”.132
The possibility raised by the eminent Austrian jurist, of an acceptance ex 
ante of a mandatory international jurisdiction may be done through a facultative 
clause of the compulsory jurisdiction which, however, admits reservations.133 A 
post facto agreement134 is always harder to get, because the parties are already 
hostile and belligerent.
In accordance to the defenders of the existence of judges ad hoc, the 
possibility to designate a judge to a Court would be stimulation to different 
States for the acceptance of the jurisdictional powers of an international tri-
bunal on a litis.135
This thought, apparently reasonable, does not resist to a deeper reflec-
tion. That is because even nominating a judge ad hoc to be part of the Court’s 
composition, the State must, above everything, rely on the other members of 
the Tribunal, once the decisions are taken in a collegiate manner.
Therefore, besides having an importance on the growth of the international 
institutions, it is not the mere nomination of judges ad hoc which may be the 
fundamental element to increase the States´ adherence on the international 
legal system.
Supporting the idea that a State should feel safer when designating an 
own national to serve on an international court is to corroborate with an out-
moded and protectionist conception of the International Law and to sustain 
the maintenance of the status quo.
The increase of the States´ participation on the international legal system 
must be followed by the strength on the Court’s legitimation, and cannot be 
done at any price, but responsibly, carefully and gradually.
132 Kelsen (1967) p.524.
133 Mello (2001) p. 651.
134 kelsen (1967) p. 524.
135 hunter and redFern (1986) p. 158.
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Even keeping a system based on the States consent136, the tendency is that 
with the development of the International Law, the establishment of a consolidated 
jurisprudence137 and the uniformization of international rules, it will be natural 
that States increase their confidence on the international systems of dispute 
settlement, and crescently recognize the competence of international courts.
IV. OTHER RELEVANT ISSUES 
1.  The problem of how precisely define the nationality of an international 
subject
The rules concerning nationality138 and its relations with the designation of 
judges ad hoc involve two distinct aspects: (1) the nationality of the individual 
named as a judge on a specific controversy and (2) the parties´ nationalities. 
A) the judge’s NAtioNAlity
The settlement of a judge’s nationality has several important implications, 
exempli gratia: (1) the most part of international courts does not accept more 
than one national from a specific State serving as a judge at the same time; (2) 
the nomination of judges sometimes must follow some specific criteria regar-
ding to their nationalities, as what happens on the IChr, which only accepts 
judges who are nationals of OAS member States139; (3) the necessity, or not, of 
the constitution of judges ad hoc.
Commonly there is no inconvenient on the definition of a judge’s natio-
nality, once it is a subject which depends exclusively on the internal Law of 
each State.140 
The uncertainties related to the judges´ nationalities happen only when 
it involves some kind of pathological status, like judges with more than one 
nationality or even stateless ones (apatrides). 
On the case of stateless judges, there must be no problems, because a judge 
who is not national of any State is, in any situation, equiparable to a foreigner. 
The same occurs in the case of citizens without State, as Palestinians and Kurds. 
136 viCuña (2004) p. 19.
137 Waldron (2005) p. 138.
138 Jones (1956) p. 3.
139 About this requirement, see specific chapter, “Right and duties of the judges ad hoc”.
140 aCCioly (2000) p. 357.
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Moreover, in cases when a judge has multiple nationalities, the rule stated 
by the main courts is that the judge is considered national of the State where 
he unremarkably exercises his civil and political rights.141
In brief, the issues related to judges´ nationalities are usually unproblematic 
and possible controversies have an elementary resolution. 
B) the pArt’s NAtioNAlity: the chANgiNg role of the diplomAtic protectioN
On the other hand, it is far from being pacific the understanding about 
how should be done the characterization of the parties´ nationalities on an 
international controversy, peculiarly because of the recent popping up of new 
subjects on that ambit, many of them with transnational features of a vast 
structural complexity. From this point of view, the delineation of the concept 
of nationality has a crucial and growing importance on the development of 
the international legal system.142 
Specifically dealing with the theme of this article, a relevant argument 
against the nomination of judges ad hoc is precisely the difficulty of finding 
a clear and definitive concept for nationality, what makes unfeasible the effet 
utile of the constitution of judges ad hoc, destabilizing the system as a whole. 
In order to understand this position and to apprehend how it is possible 
to apply the classic institute of judges ad hoc on a contemporary society full 
of intrinsic transnational relationships, it is necessary grasping how the parties 
should be represented on a litis before an international tribunal. 
141 ICJ Statute, article 3: “(1) The Court shall consist of fifteen members, no two of whom 
may be nationals of the same state. (2) A person who for the purposes of membership 
in the Court could be regarded as a national of more than one state shall be deemed to 
be a national of the one in which he ordinarily exercises civil and political rights”; ITLOS 
Statute, article 3: “No two members of the Tribunal may be nationals of the same State. 
A person who for the purposes of membership in the Tribunal could be regarded as a 
national of more than one State shall be deemed to be a national of the one in which he 
ordinarily exercises civil and political rights”; International Criminal Court Statute, article 
36: “7. La Cour ne peut comprendre plus d’un ressortissant du même État. À cet égard, 
celui qui peut être considéré comme le ressortissant de plus d’un État est censé être 
ressortissant de l’État où il exerce habituellement ses droits civiles et politiques”. 
142 viCuña (2001) p. 525. 
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In a globalized world143, it is increasing the overcoming of a positivist pa-
radigm which recognized the States as the exclusive subjects of International 
Law144, since “the role of individuals and non-state actors in the international 
system has become significant”.145 
Nevertheless, on important international courts, such as the ITLOS and 
the ICJ146, the jus standi of non-State actors is still not admissible, being always 
necessary the State representation of an individual interest. 
It is significant stressing that it is no longer applicable the old concept 
of diplomatic protection, in which there was a real endorsement by the State 
which was able to act discretionarily claiming for its own right, assuming the 
individual’s place on a controversy, and even receiving the indenizations as 
their own right. Nowadays, the legitimacy of a State on an international litis 
comes from the existence of a legal bond of nationality with the particular 
which has the interest in concretu. 
On the international jurisprudence there are innumerous cases in which 
the resolution of conflicts regarding to nationality’s facets was vital to the final 
decision of controversies. Since the PCIJ, until contemporary jurisdictional 
organisms, on arbitration and on the judicial spheres, that occurred. Exempli 
gratia, Canevaro case, Salem case, Flegenheimer case, Mergé claim, and Iran-
US A/18 case. 
Some specific decisions, notwithstanding, established new precedents on 
that subject, setting up new paradigms regarding the concept of nationality.
First of all, nowadays there is no doubt that the nationality must be effec-
tive. The principle of effectiveness – recognized at the classic Nottebohm case 
(Liechtenstein vs. Guatemala) – states that the nationality must not be merely 
apparent, but a real bond between the subject and the State is necessary.147
Secondly, it is unquestionable that with the relativization of the concept 
of sovereignty and the strengthening of a brand new jurisdictional order, the 
143 viCuña (2004) p.3.
144 JiMeneZ de aréChaga (1980) p.204.
145 viCuña (2004) p. 2.
146 Mello (2001) p. 650.
147 harris (1998) p. 594.
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contemporary tendency is to soft the concept of diplomatic protection148, as 
came about at the Letelier-Moffit case, and at the Helms Burton act and even 
on the fiduciary representation.
If the Law must reflect a certain society149 inserted on a certain historical 
period150, it is essential establishing a real effet utile to an epistemic change 
from a paradigm which used to assign value to the State sovereignty to a new 
model, in which the most important issue is the valorization of individual 
rights, through a brand new configuration of the conceptions of nationality 
and diplomatic protection. 
Then, extending the hypothesis of access to diplomatic protection, its em-
ployment (besides still remaining progressively residual) becomes a strong tool 
to make possible an universalization of the international legal system, specially 
in complex situations which would not be contemplated by the jurisdictional 
protection under its classic perspective. 
Coming back to the specific theme of this article, on the conjectures in 
which it is necessary defining the presence of national judges on international 
courts, a judge is considered a national judge when he/she has the same na-
tionality of one of the parties of the controversy. 
The more flexible the definition of the diplomatic protection, the harder 
is the task to adapt this new configuration to the nomination of judges ad hoc, 
specially when the situation involves legal people, whose nationality may be 
characterized by distinguishable manners, as demonstrated by the international 
jurisprudence.
The absolute concept of societary protection stated at the Barcelona Traction 
case, in 1970, was already overcome.151 Accordingly to that statement, only the 
country where the legal person is legally constituted is legitimated to protect 
its interests on the international sphere.
148 In the context of the ICSID, there is also the tendency to extend the coverage of diplomatic 
protection to a greater number of cases, such as what happened in the Fedax vs. Venezuela 
and Maffezini vs. Spain cases. In this sense, see the recommendations of the International 
Law Association Conference (2006).
149 dieZ de velasCo (2005) p. 55.
150 Jo (2000) p. 41. 
151 viCuña (2004) p. 42.
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At the Elettronica Sicula case a new panorama starts to be configured, 
because the ICJ confirms the existence of rights that belong to shareholders´ 
States of origin, even against the State where the society is legally established.152
Moreover, nowadays there are already cases in which even the minoritar-
ian shareholders153 have access to diplomatic protection, having their rights 
guaranteed, as, exempli gratia, at the ICSID´s CMS v. Argentina case.
So, there is an enormous diversity of criteria that try to fundament the insti-
tution of diplomatic protection of legal people, as the shareholders´ nationality 
(protecting even the minoritarian ones), the domicile (local of incorporation, 
“paper nationality”), the siége social, the main place of business, among others.
Those difficulties occur independently of the existence of judges ad hoc, 
but it is clear that with this institution the problem is even more exacerbated. 
The problem’s core is that if many States are able to represent the interests of 
a certain company before international tribunals, then judges from several 
nationalities may be considered “national judges”, bringing up the necessity 
to nominate more members ad hoc to preserve the isonomy on the courts.
Exempli gratia, assuming that a company is constituted under the laws 
of a State A and has its siège social on a country B. This same company has 
majoritarian shareholders with the nationality of C, and minoritarian ones who 
are nationals of D. In a particular controversy, it is possible to claim that, in 
accordance to the international contemporary jurisprudence, States A, B, C or 
D have locus standi to argue for the same interests.
Supposing, also, that a certain international court possesses, in its regular 
composition, nationals of A and B, both independent and unprejudiced, without 
any link with the cause unless of their nationalities.
And then, if A represents the society, it is feasible that the other part no-
minates a judge ad hoc if it has no national among the regular magistrates. On 
this first hypothesis, the judge from B (where is the company’s siège social) is 
not affected by the rules regarding to his nationality, and keeps normally his 
seat on the Bench.
Notwithstanding, if country B is representing the society’s interests, it 
is the judge from B who becomes the national judge, and the judge from A, 
152 viCuña (2004) p. 41. 
153 On a latu sensu definition of investor, especially regarding BITs.
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on the preview conjecture considered as a national judge, is considered as a 
judge without any connection to the cause (even A being the State where the 
company is legally constituted). 
A more serious situation may occur if State C (origin of the majoritarian 
shareholders) takes the main position, offering its own judge to the role of 
national judge. On this third possibility, the judges from A and B (on the other 
suppositions considered as “national judges”) remain their right to judge as a 
regular member of the court. 
Then, it may exist a hypothesis when several judges from an international 
tribunal have, in some way, bonds of nationality with one of the parties.
 Furthermore, in a world full of intense international relationships it is 
very probable that judges who are nationals of some countries, in special the 
developed ones, would be always considered as “suspects”, because of the 
existence of direct or indirect interests of their countries of origin on a plenty 
of cases.154 
On those situations, it would not be practicable to try to respect the isonomy 
through the nomination of more judges ad hoc, which would simply collapse 
the whole legal system because of its total lack of international legitimation.155 
Although, preventing those judges to act is also not feasible, because some 
judges will be always considered as partial ones. The best to do is keeping all 
judges on the cases, with the trust that they will exercise their functions auto-
nomously and impartially, independently from their nationalities.
  Through this relevant argument, it is possible to show another incompa-
tibility between the nomination of judges ad hoc and the contemporary rules of 
international Law, inserted on a globalized and multilateral reality truly diverse 
from the circumstances when the institution was created. 
154 sCoBBie (2005) p. 432.
155 On this sense, there is good analogy between this contemporary situation and the 
statement defend by Mr. Loder on the discussion of the PCIJ Statute. league oF Nations / 
Advisory CoMMittee oF Jurists (1920) p. 537.
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2.  The principle of the legal judge 
A)  sources
The principle of the legal judge (juge naturel) has its origin in the Magna 
Carta, of 1215, which stated that “no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, 
or be disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free costums, or be outlawed, or 
exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him, nor condemn 
him, but by lawful judgement of his peers, or by the Law of the Land. We will 
sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right”. 
This understanding was also presented in the French law on August 16th-
24th156, and in the French Constitution in 1791.157 Furthermore, the rule was 
expressed on the sixth amendment of the American Constitution, also promul-
gated in 1791, inspired by the English Bill of Rights, in 1689.158
However, only on the French Constitution of 1814 the principle had been 
formulated with its contemporary name, juge naturel159, influencing either the 
next Constitution, on August 14th, 1830160.
156 garCía de enterrìa (2001) p. 167.
157 MérignhaC (1905) p. 54.
  Tít. III, Chap. V, Art. 4: “Les citoyens ne peuvent être distraits des juges que la loi leur 
assigne par aucune comission, ni par d´autres attributions et évocations que celles qui sont 
determines par les lois”.
158 Amendment VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by Law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense”.
159 article 17: “nul ne pourra être distrait de ses juges naturels”.
160 article 54 had added the idea that “il ne pourra, en conséquence, être crée des comissions 
et des tribunaux extraordinaires à quelque titre et sous quelque dénomination que ce 
puisse être”.
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 This principle was, after then, spread to many classic legal systems, ex-
empli gratia, to the Statuto Albertino (Albertine Statute), in Sardegna161 and to 
the Weimar Constitution, 1919.162 
Nowadays, the principle of the juge naturel is assured by contemporary 
legislations all around the world, such as in Italy163, Spain164, Portugal165, Austria166, 
Argentina167 and Germany.168
161 Marques (2000) p. 215, art.71: “Nessuno può essere distolto daí suoi Giudici naturali. Non 
potranno perciò essere creati tribunali e Comissioni straordinarie”.
162 Art. 105: “Extraordinary courts are inadmissible. Nobody may be deprived of his ordinary 
judge. Legal regulations concerning military jurisdiction and court martial are not affected 
hereby. Military courts of honour are abolished herewith”. 
163 Italian Constitution, Art. 25: “No one may be moved from the normal judge preestablished 
by law. No one may be punished except on the basis of a law already in force before 
the offence was committed. No one may be subjected to security measures except in 
those cases provided for by law”. Translation of: “Nessuno può essere distolto dal giudice 
naturale precostituito per legge.Nessuno può essere punito se non in forza di una legge 
che sia entrata in vigore prima del fatto commesso. Nessuno può essere sottoposto a 
misure di sicurezza se non nei casi previsti dalla legge”.
164 As prescribed on the Spanish Constitutions of 1876 (art. 16), 1931 (art. 28) and 1978 
(Título I, Cap. II, Sección 1a, art. 24: “Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela 
efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin 
que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión. Asimismo, todos tienen derecho al 
Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser 
informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones 
indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su 
defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción 
de inocencia. / La ley regulará los casos en que, por razón de parentesco o de secreto 
profesional, no se estará obligado a declarar sobre hechos presuntamente delictivos”).
165 Vid. Figueiredo (2004) p. 324.
166 Art. 83, paragraph 2: “No one may be deprived of his lawful judge.”
167 Argentinean Constitution. 1994, Article 18: (“Ningún habitante de la Nación puede ser 
penado sin juicio previo fundado en ley anterior al hecho del proceso, ni juzgado por 
comisiones especiales, o sacado de los jueces designados por la ley antes del hecho de la 
causa (...)”.
168 Weimar Constitution, Article 101.1: “(l) Extraordinary courts shall not be allowed. 
No one may be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge”. Translation of 
“Ausnahmegerichte sind unzulässig. Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen 
warden”).
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In the same way, several international treaties deal with this theme and 
establish the principle of the juge naturel, exempli gratia, on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, of 1948, which, on its article 10, states that “ev-
eryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearin by a independent 
and impartial Tribunal, in determination of his rights and obligations and of any 
criminal charge against him”.
B) coNteNt
The principle of the juge naturel is a guarantee of legality169 to all citizens, 
once it is an important consequence of the principle of the due process of law. 
The preservation of the juge naturel assures that everyone who are under a 
certain jurisdiction must have, at any time, “the limits of their own freedom” 
well-established. Moreover, the “astrattezza dell´ordinamento giudiziario”170 
disallows the election of judges based on partial criteria, ad personam, which 
could vitiate the necessary judicial autonomy and nonpartisanship.171 
In the same way, on the municipal sphere, that principle is a guarantee for 
a fair trial, on the international ambit the States have the interest that the pro-
ceedings before international courts be endowed with legality and legitimacy. 
Therefore, the principle of the juge naturel can and must be applied also on 
that range, ensuring the effectiveness and the development of the international 
dispute settlement system.
The principle is constituted by four distinct features: the competence (the 
law must conferee the powers to the jurisdictional organ, also known as the 
principle of the ‘legal judge’), the independence (the judge must be prominent, 
not subordinated to the parties), the impartiality (the judge must be a third, able 
to act objectively) and anteriority (the law which constitutes the judge must be 
prior to the facts on judgment, ensuring the system’s previsibility).
To be able to develop a critical examination of the paper´s main topic, 
it is absolutely essential to apprehend if the constitution of judges ad hoc is 
compatible with those facets of the principle of the juge naturel.
169 Figueiredo (2004) p. 321.
170 CalaMandrei apud Marques (2000) p. 216.
171 Marques (2000) p. 216.
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a) Competence
On an effective international legal system, just the Law is able to establish 
the jurisdiction on a case in concretu.172 The only way to settle who will have 
the “power to enforce the Law in a bondable and cogent manner”173 is through 
a legal determination of competences.174
Actually, it is the competence attributed by law that legitimate the magistrate’s 
activity - and prevent doubts concerning their autonomy and nonpartisanship 
– what is an important evolution and radical change from the old precept of 
the nemo iudex nisi qui inter adversarios convenisset.175
Nowadays, any other method to choose a judge would characterize an 
attempt against the legality, which is not compatible with the efforts to exclu-
de the discretionarity and arbitrarity, which unfortunately are still present on 
international courts176, of the international legal order. 
Nevertheless, in the designation of judges ad hoc on international per-
manent courts there is no breach of legality, because it is the Law (expressed, 
exempli gratia, by treaties, Statutes or Conventions) which confers competences 
to those members. The institutional figure of judges ad hoc is already constitu-
ted by law, even when the individual which will hold the judge’s locus could 
only be known a posteriori.
Therefore, the competency of judges ad hoc on permanent courts is always 
assured by a legal command, without any violation of this aspect in the prin-
ciple of the judge naturel177, the legal judge. 
b) Anteriority
The issue of anteriority is related to the competence.178 In the same time 
that the statement of the judge’s jurisdictional powers must be established by 
law, that law must be previa in relation to the facts which will be judged.179
172 Figueiredo (2004) p. 322.
173 Chiovenda (1949) p. 354.
174 giFis (1998) p. 85.
175 Pessina, Storia delle leggi sul procedimento penale, Napoli, 1912, p.7, in Leone (1963) p. 21.
176 kelsen (1967) p. 526.
177 Cordero (1987) p. 260.
178 Ídem., p. 282.
179 leone (1963) p. 274.
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Unfortunately, it is still common that some international tribunals are 
constituted without the respect for this rule, in a clear violation of the Stato di 
diritto.180 Examples of that undesirable discretional behavior are the establish-
ment of Tribunals ad hoc constituted post factum, with exclusive competence 
to certain subjects, such as the criminal Courts related to the tragedies which 
happened in the ex-Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.181
However, on the case of judges ad hoc on international permanent tribu-
nals, the international legal texts which allow their nomination have always a 
prior character which, in that perspective, is also harmless to the principle of 
the juge naturel.
c) Independence
The judge’s independence on international Courts is characterized by the 
fact that they are not representing governments or States, but only concerned 
with the best exercise of their jurisdictional functions.182
The judges´ autonomy183 in relation to their States of origin (or in relation 
to any other State)184 is a real conditio sine qua non for the development of 
a trustful international legal order, which may provide the constitution of a 
jurisdictional system based on the equality between States.185
Judges ad hoc are oftentimes labeled as real representants of the parties 
on a certain controversy. It is not unreasonable that they are also known as 
“national judges”. In many cases judges ad hoc show their independence (see 
specific chapter related to judges ad hoc that had decided against the interest 
of the countries which nominated them), but, even though, there is a huge 
mistrust about them on the international society.186
Hence, there is a real paradox between the judges´ independence and 
the establishment of judges ad hoc.
180 Cordero (1987) p. 257.
181 Cançado (1999) p. 386.
182 ghevontian (1992) p.13.
183 Carnelutti (2002) p. 249.
184 leone (1963) p. 269.
185 kelsen (1967) p. 523.
186 FouChard (1991) p. 176.
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If the system ensures that there is an independent performance of the jud-
ges (considering the Court as a whole) there would be no reason to nominate 
a judge ad hoc based on that. On the other hand, if there is the assumption 
that there is no independence on the international tribunals187, then the whole 
legal systems loose its meaning, and the international courts would be mere 
political fori, opened to all kinds of pressure.
d) Impartiality
The judges´ impartiality must not be mixed up with the concept of neutrality. 
The neutrality is a subjective characteristic, bound to personal impressions that 
an individual (on this case, the judge) has about different aspects of a society. 
So, it is possible to declare that it is inconceivable that somebody could be 
perfectly neutral regarding to a subject, once the background knowledge, the 
idiosyncrasies, the reflections and the emotions of a particular individual are 
always present on his/her world’s perception.188
The nonpartisanship, from another standpoint, is an objective issue, what 
makes the judges overcome their lack of neutrality and act as an observer, facing 
up the controversy by an objective point of view, equidistant from the parties.189
Judges ad hoc are, certainly, not neutral, as no other judge or individual. 
The question is to perceive until which point their impartiality is harmed by 
the fact that they are nominated ad hoc by a certain State. 
The true is that the task of judges ad hoc is really herculean. This extreme 
difficulty comes from the fact that the State which designates him/her will 
certainly base its choice on the previous discernments demonstrated by the 
candidate, to constitute as a judge ad hoc somebody who has already a prior 
tendency to decide in some specific direction.
What frequently occurs is that this prior understanding, the reason of his 
nomination to exercise his functions on a specific controversy, is confused 
with partiality.190
On the other hand, the permanent judge which is national of one of the 
parties not necessarily has the same point of view of his State of origin. This 
187 Mosquera (1988) p. 35.
188 Coutinho (1996) p. 72.
189 Carnelutti (2002) p. 249.
190 MurPhy and PritChett (1961) p. 108
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lack of convergence, therefore, makes the State which has a national between 
the regular judges be, in a certain way, penalized. 
So, even assuming that judges ad hoc are exercising their functions im-
partially, the mere existence of that institution does not help to corroborate the 
nonpartisanship of the Tribunal as a whole, which, in praxis, has one of the 
votes priory defined.191 As stated by Scobbie, “the paradox is that in international 
law, the maintenance of impartiality is the principal reason for the provision 
of judges ad hoc”.192 
CONCLUSION
If judges ad hoc already played a significant role on the development of 
international courts, this is not a tendency anymore. Indeed, their importance 
will be continuously decreasing on the next few decades, since judges ad hoc 
are now just memories from a past when international society was still making 
its first efforts in order to guarantee a world of integration, peace and justice.
Obviously, the current international legal order is still facing a plenty of 
obstacles, specially because States are still reticent about being judged be-
yond their borders. Nevertheless, undoubtedly, the international legal system 
is already firmly constituted as an important tool on the development of the 
international society as a whole, and the legal praxis during the last fifty years 
shows that the nationality of judges is not an aspect that should be taken into 
account by States. 
In fact, the present globalized world must be understood as a part of a 
concretes paradigm, and, on this sense, understanding Dussel´s thought may 
be a very effective tool on the system´s development. The transmodernity pro-
posed by him is not compatible with rhetorical figures which were inserted on 
a habermasian structure193 and that nowadays remain as obstacles to objecti-
ve developments. On this perspective, it is essential perceiving the concrete 
outcomes of the participation of judges ad hoc, and their explicit pragmatic 
posture must influence the international legal order.
Reflecting that neo-aristotelean conception, recent developments on the 
efficaciousness of international Law are bound specially to the crescent trust of 
191 sChWeBel (1999) p. 325.
192 sCoBBie (2005) p. 428.
193 HaBerMas (1997) p. 170.
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the international community on the contemporary dispute settlement systems, 
which can be perceived by objective data.
The system´s legitimacy is strengthened by the discernible independent 
and impartial attitude of international judges and by the application of the in-
ternational Law focused mainly on the respect for the human dignity. Regional 
particularities have been increasingly taken into account by international Law, 
as a real conditio sine qua non for the development of the international legal 
structure, still based on the States´ consent.194
The discussion concerning the presence of judges ad hoc on international 
permanent tribunals has a great importance, because in praxis, their partici-
pation have been decisive on several cases, as demonstrated on this paper.
This article also proposed that judges ad hoc must be abolished from 
the international legal structure, because they are outdated remains of a time 
when there was a great lack of confidence on the effet utile of a multilateral 
order. Nevertheless, the inclusion of an advisory body, similar to the advoca-
tes-general’s structure of the ECJ, could be important to increase the system’s 
efficiency and legitimacy.
Moreover, this study proved that judges ad hoc are disadvantageous be-
cause of their preconceived logic affects the system as a whole. Titular judges 
are seen as partial ones, when in praxis, their actuation demonstrated that they 
are not representing a country or a government, being able to decide free of 
external influences. Also, judges ad hoc have a tendency to vote in accordance 
with the view of the countries which nominated them, and that is not because 
they are not independent or impartial subjects, but since their prior inclination 
to judge on a specific direction is a real prerequisite to be invited to serve as 
a judge on a certain case.
Furthermore, several developments on International Law had a negative 
impact on the institution of judges ad hoc, as the relativization of the concept 
of sovereignty and the evolution of the notion of nationality, bringing up an 
unbalanced legal structure which is not compatible with the principles of in-
terdependence, harmonic development and isonomy between States, which 
have a universal scope.
In brief, judges ad hoc are overcame tools, which in spite of being perfectly 
understandable on a fragmentary system, must not remain on a contemporary 
194 Mello (2001) p. 651.
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multilateral society with universal interests and general objectives. As stated by 
Scobbie, “the claim that a judge ad hoc is capable of making a decision more 
‘acceptable’ is based on presuppositions which lack foundation”.195
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